Report of Proceedings

4th Annual Sovereign Challenge Conference

Global
Threats

Sovereign
Solutions

16–19 March 2009, Destin, Florida

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The JSOU Press, Hurlburt Field, Florida, 2009

Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Psychological Operations: Learning Is Not a Defense Science Project, March 2007, Curtis D. Boyd

2007 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays, April 2007

Hunting Leadership Targets in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorist Operations, June 2007, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Executive Report, JSOU Second Annual Symposium (30 April–3 May 2007)

A Theory of Special Operations, October 2007, Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Block by Block: Civic Action in the Battle of Baghdad, November 2007, Adrian T. Bogart III

Private Security Infrastructure Abroad, November 2007, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Intelligence in Denied Areas, December 2007, Russell D. Howard

Is Leaving the Middle East a Viable Option, January 2008, Thomas H. Henriksen

Retaining a Precarious Value as Special Operations Go Mainstream, February 2008, Jessica Glicken Turnley

Disrupting Threat Finances, April 2008, Wesley J.L. Anderson

USSOCOM Research Topics 2009

India's Northeast: The Frontier in Ferment, September 2008, Prakash Singh

What Really Happened in Northern Ireland's Counterinsurgency, October 2008, Thomas H. Henriksen

Guerrilla Counterintelligence: Insurgent Approaches to Neutralizing Adversary Intelligence Operations, January 2009, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr.

Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN—the Thick Blue Line, February 2009, Joseph D. Celeski

Contemporary Security Challenges: Irregular Warfare and Indirect Approaches, February 2009, Richard D. Newton, Travis L. Homiak, Kelly H. Smith, Isaac J. Peltier, and D. Jonathan White

Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference Manual, March 2009

The Arabian Gulf and Security Policy: The Past as Present, the Present as Future, April 2009, Roby C. Barrett

Africa: Irregular Warfare on the Dark Continent, May 2009, John B. Alexander

USSOCOM Research Topics 2010

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Preface

Global Threats—Sovereign Solutions, the theme of the 4th Annual Sovereign Challenge Conference, focused the conferees on *Migration and Border Security*, *Transnational Crime*, and *Extremism* as threats to sovereignty and endeavored to create a dialogue to identify individual and group solutions. The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), in association with the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU), proudly hosted this conference held 16-19 March 2009 in Destin, Florida.

This booklet summarizes the very interesting and productive dialogue among senior military members and civilian diplomats of over 50 nations. Hallmarked by open and honest discussion, this conference stimulated participants to voice personal insights, perceptions, and as expected, disagreements.

The global environment is complex, and all nations have a role in building and protecting sovereignty. These threats are not vulnerable to short-term strategies. This continuing dialogue, which we call *Sovereign Challenge*, is bringing us closer to the day when we can at the very least come to a mutual understanding of the existential threat we face as sovereign nations. As we begin to look at ways to counter these threats, it is clear our sovereignty can only be strengthened through the fuller understanding resulting from conversations undertaken in this conference and related events.

Sovereign Challenge is a unique approach to solving the most important issue of our day. This conference and proceedings, as outlined in this report, bring us closer to that elusive goal of confronting those who would divide us and developing a comprehensive strategy that contributes to an international community of sovereign nations working together to effectively confront that threat.

Conference Agenda

Monday, 16 March

1800-2000 Opening Event

Major General David J. Scott (USAF), Center for Special Operations, USSOCOM (SCSO-D)

Tuesday, 17 March

0800-0845 Opening Remarks and Sovereign Challenge Update

Admiral Eric T. Olson (USN), Commander, USSOCOM—Welcome and Conference Remarks via video

Mr. Stan Schrager, Center for Special Operations, USSOCOM (SCSO-J55-SEG)—Sovereign Challenge Overview

Major General David J. Scott (USAF), Center for Special Operations, USSOCOM (SCSO-D)—Sovereign Challenge Conference Goals

0845-0945 Global Threat—*Migration and Border Security*

Brigadier General (Ret.) Wilson Boinett, former Chief of Kenya Intelligence Service—Contested Sovereignty and the Challenge of Terrorism: Experiences from the Horn of Africa

1015-1145 Breakout Discussion Groups

1300-1400 Global Threat—*Transnational Crime*

Mr. Joe Orrigo, INTERPOL—International Collaboration in Addressing Transnational Criminal/Terrorist Issues

1430-1600 Breakout Discussion Groups

1830-2100 Hosted Dinner and Keynote Address

Major General David J. Scott (USAF), Center for Special Operations, USSOCOM (SCSO-D)

Wednesday, 18 March

0815-0915 Global Threat—*Extremism*

Mr. Peter Bergen, CNN—Al Qaeda and Taliban Origins, Evolution, Strategies, and Assessment

0945-1045 Global Threat—*Extremism*

Mr. Maajid Nawaz, Director of the Quilliam Foundation—Challenging Ideological Rhetoric that Feeds Extremism

1100-1215 Breakout Discussion Groups

1400-1500	Dr. Saad Al-Jabry, Special Advisor, Ministry of Security Affairs, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—De-radicalization & Rehabilitation
1530-1700	Breakout Discussion Groups
1830-2100	Dinner and Country Presentations
	Colonel Carlos Bueno, Colombia—Building a Path Toward a New Horizon
	Mr. Tor Burman, EUROPOL Liaison Officer—EUROPOL
	Colonel Hans van der Louw, Netherlands—Assimilation of Minorities in the Netherlands

Thursday, 19 March

0800-0830	Dr. Brian Maher, President, Joint Special Operations University—Building Capabilities by Operationalizing Knowledge
0900-0930	Breakout Groups 1 and 2 Outbrief: Sovereign Solutions to *Extremism*
1000-1030	Breakout Groups 3 and 4 Outbrief: Sovereign Solutions to *Transnational Crime*
1030-1100	Breakout Groups 5 and 6 Outbrief: Sovereign Solutions to *Migration and Border Security*
1100-1115	Closing Remarks
	Major General David J. Scott (USAF), Center for Special Operations, USSOCOM (SCSO-D)
	Mr. Stan Schrager, Center for Special Operations, USSOCOM (SCSO-J55-SEG)

Introduction

> *If you want to walk fast you walk alone, if you want to walk far, you walk together.*
>
> *– African proverb*

T he United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) hosted 73 Defense Attachés and Diplomats representing 52 countries at the 4th Annual Sovereign Challenge Conference from 16–19 March 2009.

Sovereign Challenge is a USSOCOM international engagement action project that focuses on the sovereignty of independent nations and how terrorism violates that sovereignty. The project is based on the premise that each nation's sovereign responsibility to act in its own self-interest and maintain faith with its citizens, cultures, and national interests conveys the specific responsibility to develop national programs to prevent and counter terrorism. Guided by this year's conference theme of *Global Threats—Sovereign Solutions*, attendees focused on three major issues: *Migration and Border Security*, *Transnational Crime*, and *Extremism*.

Five speakers offered insights into these issues; six discussion groups examined them in greater detail. On the final day, the groups presented their assessments of one of the issues and offered suggestions for dealing with the challenge. As part of that process, Group 2 offered a graphic portrayal of the complexities of dealing with extremism (included in Breakout Group Discussions). The chart so captured the interest of the attendees that it was placed on the Sovereign Challenge Web site to solicit comments and suggestions from the Sovereign Challenge community as a possible path for future discussions.

In addition to the separate discussions of *Migration and Border Security*, *Transnational Crime*, and *Extremism*, the discussion groups were encouraged to seek linkages among them. The goal was to come to an understanding of how they collectively affect national sovereignty, then develop recommendations for preventing, challenging, and mitigating those effects. Speaker and discussion observations and recommendations are located in the Common Themes section.

Separate presentations by representatives from Colombia, the Netherlands, EUROPOL, JSOU, and the Defense Attachés Association of Washington D.C. rounded out the program.

Conference participants, Destin, Florida

Common Themes

This section contains the common observations and recommendations that emerged from the comments of the speakers and the discussions and presentations of the six breakout groups. Themes collected under Linkages reflect to the extent possible the connectivity among the three major issues that emerged during the conference.

Linkages—*Migration and Border Security, Transnational Crime,* and *Extremism*

- Global support for the concept of a *war on terror* is waning. Participants were wary of militarizing every response to a terrorist incident. There seemed to be a consensus that this problem may be mitigated within the realm of law enforcement and policing.
- The U.S. strategy to fight terrorism is unclear to many. America cannot fight terrorism with the same strategy or approach in different countries and regions. Strategies unique to each nation or region should be developed through interagency efforts.
- Terrorism is largely a political issue that manifests itself through law enforcement threats best handled by police and paramilitary forces. Thus the concept of a global war on terror is likely an overstatement of the challenge.
- Uncertainty persists over the nature and causes of terrorism, so a need exists for a common understanding of the terrorist threat and whether it is regional or global.
- Cooperation and coordination in all forms, both regionally and globally, are essential to address threats to sovereignty.
- It is necessary to develop protocols for the sharing of classified and open-source information on extremists, transnational criminals, and migration and border security issues.
- It is necessary to move beyond "tactical band-aids" to a coordinated strategy for dealing with threats to sovereignty.
- Good governance that is acceptable to the local population, rule of law, and economic development are essential for ensuring stability and national sovereignty.

- Security is essential to economic development and other root-cause solutions. The challenge is to achieve a shared sense of how that security is established and sustained.
- Threats to sovereignty must be addressed by the right mix of defense, development and diplomacy.
- Given the complexity of the threats posed by extremists, transnational criminal elements, and migration and border security concerns, military forces will often—but not always—have roles to play, but not likely the leading role.
- Military forces will take the lead when threats affect a region or when it is necessary to project national power beyond sovereign borders.
- Each country has established different roles for law enforcement and the military, but the greater the information sharing and coordination, the more effective both will be.
- Individual countries and regional partners should seek to identify security weaknesses, gaps and seams that can be exploited by extremists, transnational criminals, and mass migration movements.
- Understand that both extremist and transnational criminal networks rely on and leverage similar funding, logistics, transportation, and security support structures, especially within ungoverned spaces.
- Do not ignore the competence of the leadership and security structures of small countries. Define niche roles that such sovereign nations can perform.
- Address conditions of poverty, poor governance, and areas of persistent conflict such as Israel/Palestine.
- Knowing when to act is a function of the assessed reliability of available information, not the presence of indisputable evidence.
- As extremists and transnational criminal organizations recognize no borders, our reluctance to share information and interact operationally makes it more difficult to protect ourselves.

Sovereign Solutions to *Migration and Border Security*

- Migration is continuous, both internally and externally, for economic, political, social, and humanitarian reasons.
- Economics is the greatest migratory instigator, even when the proximate cause is the quest for personal security from other threats.

- Ungoverned borders provide opportunities for transnational criminals, extremists, and other threats to national sovereignty.
- Movements of people bring with them significant ideological, political, cultural, social, economic, security and legal challenges.
- Migration and border *management* are essential, even as migration and border *control* largely remains impossible.
- Regional cooperation and coordination are essential for preventing, managing and mitigating the consequences of migration.
- Migration may affect a state's definition of sovereignty and its ability to exercise it; the presence of new political ideologies and parties can destabilize governance and social structures.
- Contemporary migration has both positive and negative effects, resulting in opportunities and challenges for both gaining and losing states.
- Migrants successfully integrated into society are less susceptible to extremist ideology; thus countries are well served by programs that facilitate social and economic integration of migrants.

Sovereign Solutions to *Transnational Crime*

- There is a link between transnational crime and terrorists. Terrorists leverage transnational criminal communications, logistics, transportation, and financial networks.
- Information sharing allows global law enforcement efforts to shift from the passive (waiting for something to happen) to the active (a strategy for engagement).
- If someone is engaged in a disruptive behavior, it is difficult to determine if it is a criminal activity (financially motivated) or terrorist activity (politically motivated).
- Law enforcement has the leading role in addressing issues of transnational crime with the military acting in a supporting role.
- When dealing with classified law enforcement information, it is usually the methods and sources—not the content—that is sensitive. However, there is a risk that content becomes the issue when information represents the lowest common denominator of those countries willing to share.

- Increased connectivity leads to an increased need for laws regulating behavior, which results in more opportunities for lawbreaking and the further disruption of good order and stability.
- In the absence of good governance, laws generally treat symptoms rather than root causes; the random promulgation of laws tends to increase general lawlessness.

Sovereign Solutions to *Extremism*

- Grievances alone are not enough to radicalize a person; it takes an ideology that frames grievances and gives people a sense of identity and of belonging to create extremists.
- Extreme ideologies must be challenged by credible narratives that counter misrepresentations of the Muslim faith.
- To counter extreme ideology, we must assume the mindset of a "war of ideas"—to present other ideas, to give people alternative narratives—to show why opposing ideas present incorrect interpretations.
- Provide education as early as possible to challenge the ideology and rhetoric that feeds extremism.
- Resolving the Israel-Palestine issue is an important step to undermine extremist ideology and rhetoric.
- The failure of domestic development models (with accompanying poor living conditions and unemployment) and perceptions of injustice (e.g., Palestine, Abu Ghraib) provide environments conducive to the radicalization of Muslim youth.
- The terrorist threat has transformed into a "leaderless jihad" of various groups with local grievances or criminals who tap into transnational capabilities and ideology.
- Do not provide extremists with unearned stature by crediting them with exaggerated accomplishments or unrealized influence.
- Islamists are not Jihadists, and conservative Muslims are not Islamists.
- Most Islamists are not theologically educated, but more often come from technical backgrounds such as engineering and medicine while the "foot soldiers," the so-called cannon fodder, are more likely to be uneducated and living in poverty.

- It is necessary to come to agreement about the root causes of extremism and to develop initiatives to address them locally, regionally and internationally.
- A persistent need exists to address the economic imbalance between developed and developing nations through investment.
- If a problem can be identified early and prevented from developing, there will be few or no negative consequences.
- It has become more difficult for governments to meet the expectations of their populations. Thus organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas provide basic human services when governments are unable, thereby undermining credibility and sovereignty.
- Legitimate grievances must be addressed through international or sovereign-nation institutions.
- It would be helpful to arrive at a common understanding of *how* and *when* elements of *soft* and *hard* power should be employed to counter extremism.

Speaker Presentations

Migration and Border Security

Brigadier General (Ret.) Wilson Boinett—Contested Sovereignty and the Challenge of Terrorism: Experiences from the Horn of Africa

BG Boinett's presentation introduced strong linkages among the three conference issues. Chief among these was the notion that migrations provide both recruits and victims for extremists, criminals and other forms of instability.

He employed two important metaphors to guide his comments. The first of these was that of a *sovereign village* that shares information and coordinates with surrounding villages for common benefit. While self-sufficiency is essential to the concept of sovereignty, so also is the need to share information regionally and globally. Boinett acknowledged that countries, like villages, are often reluctant to share information.

What is possible, however, is engaging neighboring countries to develop complementary migration strategies, policies and procedures. Such cooperation is particularly important in addressing internal and cross-border areas of failed governance that form breeding grounds for transnational crime and terrorism. By contrast, he warned that unilateral actions frequently have severe consequences on the ground in the form of mass migrations and the problems that accompany them.

The fact is that migration is a continuous process as people are always moving about and national boundaries are not always clear, especially in Africa. As territoriality defined by geographic borders is an "ingredient" of sovereignty, uncertainty over the location of those boundaries poses a persistent threat to sovereignty and presents an opportunity for instability. Cross-border communities become "bridgeheads" for extremists, criminals and their supporting infrastructures that threaten the collection of villages that make up a sovereign state.

BG Boinett's second metaphor concerned the existence of *cooking pots* where terrorist ideology and capabilities come together to create threats that then migrate to areas of poverty, failed governance, and persistent grievance. *Bandit economies* emerge in refugee concentrations based on arms trafficking, illegal drug trades, money laundering, human trafficking, and property

theft. Such conditions lead to a nexus where terrorists and traditional criminal enterprises merge their activities. As BG Boinett noted, terrorists can now plan in one country, generate revenue in a second, then carry out the plan in yet a third.

Brigadier General (Ret.) Wilson Boinett

In such an environment, terrorism acts as a market activity that accrues to the benefit of both extremists and transnational criminals and leads to the movement of large sums of money across borders. As new illegal behavior shows itself, enforcement activities force extremists and criminals to hide what they are doing, resulting in sophisticated Black Market operations that sustain criminality and result in broad areas of instability.

Such threats to sovereignty are made worse because of the absence of state institutions, especially in cross-border areas, and the exploitation of new freedoms that frequently serve as enablers for disruptive behavior. The fact that bandit economies are increasingly "virtual" in their functioning makes them especially difficult to control, particularly in poorer countries.

As part of their efforts to address these threats to sovereignty, BG Boinett reported that Kenya and its neighbors have taken the follow steps:

a. Formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to attempt to stabilize Somalia
b. Creation of the National Counterterrorism Centre to address internal security
c. Creation of a Regional Fusion Center (RFC) for intelligence sharing among those "sharing borders."

He concluded with thoughts on the future of terrorism:

a. Terrorism will be "forever with us as long as human nature is about struggle and survival."

b. The concept of a global war on terrorism is a "bridge too far" and can create a false paradigm that serves as "a force multiplier for the terrorists."

c. It is necessary to attack the "axis of evil" by focusing on unresolved conflicts, poverty, poor governance, and other factors that cause national and regional instability.

d. Need greater sensitivity to the reality that unilateral actions taken by a given state frequently generate collateral damage to neighboring states and their national interests.

Additional points included the following:

a. Do not underestimate the competence of third-world leadership and security institutions.

b. Greater sensitivity is necessary to the divide between developed and developing nations and the necessity to invest in development.

c. Address areas of persistent conflict (e.g., Israel and Palestine), poverty, and poor governance.

d. Almost all previous terrorist attacks in Kenya are traceable to Somalia.

e. Understand that migration is continuous, both internally and externally.

f. Terrorism is a law enforcement issue; also, the concept of a global war on terror is likely an overstatement of the challenge.

g. Terrorism is primarily a political issue.

h. Information sharing is essential, but information is not necessarily evidence.

i. Knowing when to act is tied to the reliability of shared information, not to the presence of indisputable evidence.

Transnational Crime

Mr. Joseph Orrigo—International Collaboration in Addressing Transnational Criminal/Terrorist Issues

Drawing on the need for a system of information sharing, Mr. Orrigo's comments argued that INTERPOL is an institution that provides a forum for global coordination of law enforcement activities. Coupled with a later

presentation by an attendee representing EUROPOL, Mr. Orrigo's discussion of INTERPOL capabilities fit with emerging views from the conference that the issues under discussion lend themselves more to law enforcement than to military solutions. (Although the military plays an integral role in the partnership of information sharing because of their diverse locations and collection opportunities)

Mr. Joseph Orrigo

He argued that INTERPOL seeks to assist sovereign nations to operate within their own laws while working together to identify, prevent, and suppress criminal activity. Thus the challenge becomes how to balance sovereignty concerns with efficiencies gained by sharing. Mr. Orrigo noted that turf issues, reluctance to share information, failure to coordinate activities, and a resistance to change limit cooperative efforts. In fact, innovation is sometimes viewed as a threat. INTERPOL-enabling tools such as extensive databases, telecom systems, analytical resources, specialized training, and 187 country memberships are designed to overcome such restrictive behavior and facilitate interaction among sovereign states. To that end, he characterized the database systems as the "heart of the organization."

One of the pressing concerns is to determine the relationship between transnational criminals and terrorists. It is clear that drugs, human trafficking, extortion, money laundering, and other behaviors benefit both groups because of the ability of each to generate revenue. Given those realities, is there an "agnostic group of criminals who will essentially work with anyone?" It is important to understand all aspects of the criminal action to determine whether the criminal or terrorist activities are the result of deliberate strategies of cooperation rather than relationships of convenience.

Additional points included the following:

a. Information sharing allows global law enforcement efforts to shift from the passive (waiting for something to happen) to proactive (a strategy of engagement).

b. As terrorists recognize no borders, the more we choose not to interact, the more difficult it is to protect ourselves. The criminal thrives on anonymity.

c. If someone is engaged in disruptive activity, it is difficult to determine if it is a criminal activity (financially motivated) or terrorist activity (politically motivated). It is important that we take action and not wait to determine clear-cut lines because they often overlap. We need to continually assess all information for potential targeting opportunities.

d. Each country has different roles for law enforcement and military, but the greater the information sharing and coordination, the more effective both will be. When dealing with classified information, it is the methods and sources—not the content—that makes the information classified. When compromise is not affected, it behooves us to share the content.

Extremism

Mr. Peter Bergen—Al Qaeda and Taliban Origins, Evolution, Strategies, and Assessment

Noting that Al Qaeda recently celebrated its 20th anniversary, Mr. Bergen precisely summarized the past two decades of its activities. One of the chief lessons is that small groups can affect history. The fact is that Osama bin Laden has inflicted more damage on the U.S. than did the Soviet Union.

However, more than seven years after the 9/11 attacks, some believe that bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization have largely faded into irrelevance. As evidence, such views point out that no further attacks have taken place against the U.S. and that bin Laden seems able to threaten Americans only through video- and audiotapes that occasionally pop up on the Internet.

Mr. Bergen acknowledged that Al Qaeda's ability is "close to zero now in the U.S." for the following reasons:

a. The Muslim community is well integrated into U.S. society and has largely rejected Al Qaeda ideology. On average, Muslims are better educated and "rather well off" when compared with their fellow Americans.

b. Al Qaeda "sleeper cells" do not exist in the U.S. "If they are here, they are comatose or dead."

c. It is increasingly difficult for Jihadi terrorists to get into the U.S. today.

d. In general, Al Qaeda is weaker today than in September 2001.

That said, other groups inspired by Al Qaeda may yet strike the U.S., but so might other groups to include domestic organizations with their own agendas.

However, Mr. Bergen argues, Al Qaeda does have significant influence on events in Afghanistan and Pakistan and a continued capacity to carry out attacks against the West, particularly in Europe and other centers of western influence (e.g. businesses, hotels, and citizens around the world). He noted that Al Qaeda is "nearly dead in Iraq" because of a "suicide assisted by SOCOM."

Perhaps the major long-term problem for bin Laden is that the global Muslim community is increasingly taking a "dim view" of Al Qaeda and

Mr. Peter Bergen

its reliance on suicide operations. It was not long ago that bin Laden was, for many, an Islamic folk hero. As Al Qaeda and its affiliates have killed thousands of Muslim civilians since 9/11, polls taken in key Muslim countries, such as Indonesia and Pakistan, indicate that support for Al Qaeda's leader nose-dived after 2003.

Bergen argued that some of the consequences of bin Laden's actions have frequently proved counterproductive to his overall strategy. These include the U.S. attack on Afghanistan, increased U.S. influence in Pakistan, and stronger U.S. relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and others. These outcomes were certainly not contained within bin Laden's original intent.

However, bin Laden and his followers remain a strong presence. This is often because of the sophisticated propaganda strategy employed by Al Qaeda and a public relations capacity to produce high quality electronic

programming that flows through the Internet and traditional broadcast media. These are important tools in sustaining Al Qaeda's ideological narrative. Bergen noted that the Taliban, who once banned television when they ruled Afghanistan, now employ many of the same advanced communications techniques developed by Al Qaeda.

While judging the use of nuclear weapons as "unlikely" and "too hard to do," Mr. Bergen then peered carefully into the future to outline what he characterized as plausible future threats that demand collective attention. These include the detonation of a radiological or dirty bomb and an attack against a civilian airliner using a surface-to-air missile. He assessed the recent trend to strike soft targets, such as hotels, as evidence of some weakening of Al Qaeda capabilities.

As a general rule, he argued that terrorists will "default" to weapons they know best such as vehicle bombs and AK-47s and noted the Mumbai attack as an example of this reality. The pursuit of terrorists requires continual assessment of both their willingness and capabilities to strike.

Mr. Bergen identified four strategic *weaknesses* that have the potential to limit future Al Qaeda effectiveness. These include the ongoing killing of Muslim civilians, the lack of a positive vision, the tendency to be "exclusive" by acting as the sole arbiter of who is a "true Muslim," and with the possible exception of Taliban (Pashtun) populations in Afghanistan, a persistent failure to turn themselves into a popular political movement.

Additional points included the following:

a. Global support for the concept of a *war on terror* is waning. Participants were wary of militarizing every response to a terrorist incident. There seemed to be a consensus that this problem may be mitigated within the realm of law enforcement and policing.

b. The U.S. was attacked and cannot pretend it is not at war.

c. The president must answer the question, "What kind of war are we engaged in?"

d. The challenge should not be seen as a global police action against Al Qaeda.

Extremism

Mr. Maajid Nawaz—Challenging Ideological Rhetoric that Feeds Extremism

Mr. Maajid Nawaz presented a compelling personal story of his radicalization at the age of 16, his successful activities on behalf of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, and his complex, successful rehabilitation.

Hizb-ut-Tahrir is an organization that propagates an ideology that feeds terrorism. In a complete reversal, Mr. Nawaz has now established the Quilliam Foundation to address misrepresentations of the true Muslim faith carried out by Islamist movements. Critical to his comments was the understanding that while the process of radicalization is affected by grievances, those grievances become exploitable only

Mr. Maajid Nawaz (center)

when they are provided with ideological interpretation and context by a recruiter.

Thus recruiting is about creating narratives that account for experience. Mr. Nawaz found himself alienated and disenfranchised from the society into which he was born. Though a third-generation citizen of the United Kingdom living in Essex, he and his friends frequently found themselves stalked and attacked by extremist groups such as "Combat 18" who persisted in violent "Paki Bashing." One of his best friends was brutally beaten with a hammer, and Mr. Nawaz himself was arrested on suspicion of armed robbery because of the possession of a pellet gun.

Though later released with a police apology, Mr. Nawaz increasingly saw himself separated from the country into which he was born. When eventually approached by a recruiter, he began to see himself as a part of the global struggle of Muslims everywhere. Thus Mr. Nawaz began to identify himself as Muslim rather than British.

He spent years serving as a recruiter and leader of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, embedding himself within universities in the United Kingdom and elsewhere. He

was active in Europe, particularly Denmark, and worked in various places in Pakistan. He eventually traveled to Egypt to study and was jailed in April 2002. It was during his time in prison that Nawaz began to reassess his personal understanding of his Muslim faith.

During his presentation, Mr. Nawaz distinguished between *Islamist ideology* and *Islam*, noting that the former is not derived from traditional Islamic thinking. Rather it is a construct that has its roots in the 1920s with the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood and other related organizations whose goals remain anchored in the political objectives of control over all aspects of daily life. Thus Islamist ideology emerged from totalitarian political thinking such as Nazism, fascism, and communism, not from conservative religious thought or a coherent faith structure. Within this context, democracy is viewed as apostasy because it espouses a man-made rule of law that is characterized as abhorrent to God's law.

In attempting to counter the Islamists, it is not enough to address conditions of poverty and deprivation. Mr. Nawaz pointed out that many of the most radical are from well-to-do families and are well educated. It is the suicide bombers and others used in attacks—the "cannon fodder"—who come from the poorest classes.

Mr. Nawaz argued that "Islam is more tolerant and pluralist" than taught by some and believed by many. Ideological confrontation is essential. It is not the intent that the Muslim faith dominate the world and that Sharia Law reign supreme everywhere. It is wrong to believe that all aspects of life must pass through Islamist ideology. "If you want to talk economics, talk to an economist, not a Mullah," suggested Mr. Nawaz.

He warned that pushback against Islamist ideology will remain a long-term challenge. Extremists will remain active in the West because there they can raise large sums of money, recruit from fertile areas of grievance, and exploit the concentrations of news and other media systems that are present. For instance, much of the Islamist narrative is developed and disseminated through organizations in London.

Additional points included the following:

a. Most Islamists are not theologically educated, but more often come from technical backgrounds (engineering, medicine).
b. Ideologies must be challenged.

c. Islamists are not Jihadists, and conservative Muslims are not Islamists.
d. Well-armed, organized and aggressive militants have been successful in intimidating the majority of the population and stifling dissent in Pakistan and elsewhere.

De-radicalization & Rehabilitation

Dr. Saad Al-Jabry—De-radicalization & Rehabilitation

The presentation by Dr. Saad Al-Jabry introduced participants to the very promising Saudi Arabian De-radicalization and Rehabilitation Program that has already established a record of success. These ongoing programs are part of a wider counterterrorism effort that, since 2003, has gone through three phases of effort (Momentum, Regrouping and Fragmentation) by focusing on men, money and mindset.

During the *Momentum Phase*, terrorists trained in Afghanistan and elsewhere drew on an Al Qaeda network for support, training, forged documents, and weapons. Targets within Saudi Arabia during this phase included expatriates, diplomatic compounds, infrastructure, financial institutions, and various officials, security officers and scholars. In response, the Saudi government engaged in extensive counterterrorism operations, employed a variety of human intelligence and signal intelligence assets, targeted the terrorist military and intellectual leadership, safeguarded critical infrastructure, tightened border security, and adapted flexibly to the evolving threat.

Saudi counterterrorism successes forced the terrorists into the *Regrouping Phase*, characterized by disintegration into smaller cells, development of new leadership, departure from Riyadh and, in some cases, from the country, and a reprioritization of targets. The subsequent terrorist *Fragmentation Phase* has been characterized by an absence of both military and ideological leadership, the discontinuance of local propaganda efforts, and the reliance on ineffective operations security measures.

By adopting the mindset of a *war of ideas*, the Saudis were able to craft a strategic direction for their counter-radicalization and rehabilitation efforts. A major focus centers on the narratives disseminated through mosques, especially during Friday prayers. The rehabilitation of individual *deviants*

(as the Saudis call them because they diverge from the teachings of Islam) is based on the notion of the need to "change my belief, and I will follow you." Thus counter-radicalization efforts seek to undermine Takfiri ideology and expose it for its violent methods as ways to undercut recruiting and challenge its believers. Rehabilitation seeks to bring about a change in behavior through disengagement and de-radicalization.

Individuals are assessed for their current state of belief, engaged in dialogue, challenged for their misinterpretations of Islam, given responsibilities, and prepared for return to "normal" life. Specific means include religious education, social support, psychological programs, training, recreational activities, fine arts, and extracurricular activities. Traditionally strong Arab families are also engaged both to provide supervision of the deviant once released and to prevent future recruitment of that person or others. The government engages the general public in the program to demonstrate that the government is acting responsibly and appropriately dealing with the deviants' flawed approach and understanding and to build public opinion against the deviants.

Dr. Al-Jabry characterized as major challenges the lack of a comprehensive body of research on de-radicalization and rehabilitation practices and the general absence of risk assessment tools that can be applied to individual candidates for such programs.

Other concerns focus on instability created by regional sectarian conflicts, the intrusion of nonstate actors, shortcomings in international cooperation protocols, the need to secure national and regional energy resources, current events (national, regional and international), and the requirements for managing the Hajj and Umrah pilgrimages. Illegal immigration problems posed by pilgrims and outside workers who remain after their visitor or work visas expire also contribute to potential pools of manpower for terrorist recruiting.

Country Presentations

Each of these presentations served as a practical case study that animated the issues of *Migration and Border Security, Transnational Crime*, and *Extremism* as discussed both by the conference presentations and the breakout groups.

Colonel Carlos Bueno, Colombia—Building a Path Toward a New Horizon

Citing as its goal "Sustainable Peace for Columbia," this presentation documented the significant successes achieved by government authorities in recent years to address the scourges posed by extremism, transnational crime, and internal migration. It emphasized the role of the FARC as the major threat to national security and sovereignty. As a narcoterrorist organization, the FARC represents the nexus of extremism and transnational crime. FARC's activities have for years caused instability that has resulted in forced drug trafficking, kidnappings, child recruitment, targeted attacks on the civilian population, ecocide, and forced displacements of major portions of the population to escape both FARC influence and the government's efforts to challenge them.

Experience has taught that internal migrations have had both bad and good consequences. The policy to protect the population has proven successful in providing legitimacy to the central government through "military social work" that has supplied basic needs, increased the efficiency of governance, ensured accountability, and provided for necessary transparency in the effort. A March 2009 Gallup Colombia Opinion Poll indicates that 77 percent of the population is supportive of Colombian Military Forces because of their efforts.

Central to these efforts have been establishment of territorial control and stabilization, demobilization of insurgents, and consolidation and coordination of government efforts and resources. Additional efforts have also been successful in neutralizing FARC propaganda initiatives.

Mr. Tor Burman—EUROPOL

As a companion to the presentation on INTERPOL, Mr. Burman's comments about EUROPOL identified it as a criminal intelligence agency. As it has no executive powers, EUROPOL respects the national sovereignty of the

individual states of the European Union. It acts through law enforcement agencies (LEAs) to address common issues of domestic and international criminal elements. Mandated areas of interest include drugs, illegal immigration, trafficking in human beings, money laundering, terrorism and Euro counterfeiting.

EUROPOL's resources include Analytical Work Files (AWFs) that document persons, vehicles, contacts, phone numbers, and other essential information that may assist law enforcement officials. EUROPOL also maintains Information Systems (ISs) that store data and issue periodic analytical reports. The organization also produces Automated Cross-Border Crime Check Notifications.

Current counterterrorism mandates are terrorism, racism and xenophobia, trafficking in nuclear and radioactive substances, and trafficking of weapons, ammunition and explosives. Contributors to the EUROPOL counterterrorism efforts include police agencies, politicians, justice officials, and the intelligence community.

Col Hans van der Louw, Netherlands—Assimilation of Minorities in the Netherlands

Colonel van der Louw began with an historical discussion of the transformation of Dutch policy beginning with the 1980s when he said the Netherlands was considered a safe haven. That is no longer true.

Echoing comments made by Mr. Maajid Nawaz earlier, Colonel van der Louw noted that migrations and guest laborers have introduced different cultures to the Dutch mix. As with the United Kingdom, concerns focus on the third generation of immigrants, especially those of Moluccan heritage who see themselves as neither Moluccan nor Dutch. These developments have led to some homegrown radicalized youth. Recent assassinations by the "Animal Liberation Front" and Islamists graphically portray the range of threats to the sovereign Dutch nation.

The Dutch assessment is that strategies should focus as much as possible on prevention by addressing root-cause grievances about social, religious, economic, educational and rule-of-law issues. As a general rule, the lead in counterterrorist efforts falls to justice and law enforcement officials. The military provides support.

For instance, efforts directed at radicalization balance both *prevention* and *repression*. Among these steps are:

a. Prevention—Community Outreach Programs
b. Repression—Police and Intelligence Services
c. Coordination—National Coordinator for Combating Terrorism (since 9/11).

More specifically, the Dutch have initiated a whole-of-government inter-agency strategy. The Dutch approach includes:

a. Understanding that repression alone does not work
b. Empowering the lowest level of government to include local towns, cities, districts, and national elected officials to take necessary steps to secure their populations, which includes the numerous sub-mayors of Amsterdam
c. Targeting prominent opinion leaders (the *influentials*) such as imams, teachers, and family structures
d. Emphasizing rule-of-law or justice strategies (law-enforcement issue)
e. Strengthening intelligence and police resources, to include international cooperation and integration when appropriate.

Breakout Group Presentations

To enhance discussion and collaboration, identify concerns and issues for future consideration, and recommend solutions to the stated challenges, Sovereign Challenge participants were divided into six breakout groups. Each group reflected a cross section of nations and was guided by an assigned moderator. Following the presentations made in plenary sessions, breakout groups convened to discuss the specifics of each speaker's comments. Additionally, each breakout group was assigned one of this year's Sovereign Challenge topics and was responsible for reporting on that topic at the end of the conference. The topics and associated assignments were:

    a. Sovereign Solutions to *Extremism*, Groups 1 and 2
    b. Sovereign Solutions to *Transnational Crime*, Groups 3 and 4
    c. Sovereign Solutions to *Migration and Border Security*, Groups 5 and 6.

The moderators from all six groups reported candid and enthusiastic exchanges that reflected the perspectives of the individual countries while seeking to understand both the complexities and consequences of the individual issues. The following is a summary of the breakout group discussions and report.

Breakout Group Session

Groups 1 & 2, Sovereign Solutions to *Extremism*

Group 1, drawing upon Mr. Maajid Nawaz's presentation, identified the root causes of extremism as being ideology that drives recruitment and justifies activities, not just Al Qaeda ideology but also other extreme ideologies. Poverty was mentioned as a potential driver, or variable, but the group kept coming back to ideology as the root cause because many extremist group leaders come from backgrounds where they are well educated and well off. Extremist ideology frames grievances (perceived injustices, alienation, humiliation, reactions to civilian casualties, and the unresolved Israel-Palestine situation) into narratives that give people a sense of identity and belonging.

In response, the group noted that the psychological components of ideology make it difficult to know how people think; therefore, attempts to challenge ideology should be framed as a battle for hearts and minds. To counter extreme ideology, we need to consider a mindset of a war of ideas—to present other ideas, to give people an alternative—to show why competing ideas present incorrect interpretations. They also noted that apologies, where appropriate (Guantanamo Bay was given as an example), would undermine grievances and reach out to moderates who are listening.

Coupled with initiatives to confront extremist ideology was the need for good governance that is (1) acceptable to the local population, (2) follows the rule of law, and (3) encourages economic development. To accomplish good governance, they proposed the three Ds: *defense* (to provide security) and *diplomacy* (to coordinate efforts regionally and globally), which collectively lead to *development* (which increases stability and security). Two final solutions included counter-radicalization and prevention, as discussed in the Saudi Arabian presentation of their model, and for the U.S. to use its leverage to solve the Israel-Palestine problem. One general conclusion derived from the Group 1 discussions is the notion that the *global war on terrorism* is not a viable term.

Group 2 breakout discussions began with addressing border security, immigration, and transnational crime. Based upon the findings in these discussions they presented a systems slide laying out an integrated overview of proposed ways of thinking for both preventing and eliminating extremist threats through a comprehensive "Whole-of-Government" approach.

It was generally agreed that border security is problematic in many countries due to a lack of effective border management protocols (e.g., Horn of Africa), naturally porous borders (e.g., Philippines and Indonesia), and a lack of regional cooperation (e.g., Colombia noted that terrorists stage in neighboring countries to then execute cross-border attacks). Inadequate border security then makes it difficult to control immigration and counter transnational crimes. Regarding the movement of people, the group agreed that migration is a persistent fact within society and therefore countries must work to assimilate immigrant communities.

The Philippines noted that 10 percent of their population is employed overseas. Other nations noted that large migrant communities often over-tax the ability of the nation to address the immigrants' needs and could lead to further instability throughout the country. This leads to the larger theme of an economic imbalance between developed and developing nations. Kenya, for instance, noted that they are not looking for handouts but rather for investments in their country.

In looking to the future of border security, the group recommended regional cooperation and presented the European Union as a model, noting that it may be the "outer borders" of these regions that will present the greatest challenges. In discussing transnational crime, the group again recommended regional cooperation and used the INTERPOL and EUROPOL models as examples. Further hindering countertransnational crime efforts is political corruption, which undermines the principles of good governance and the rule of law. However, noting that most societies have some level of corruption, they questioned the point at which corrupt behavior becomes a true problem.

In addition to increased regional cooperation and good governance to counter transnational crime, the group recommended going after the money and infiltrating the criminal groups. To counter extremism, the group agreed that the nation state needs to provide the security and foundation for investment, economic development, and prosperity. Essential to this was the need to expand trade within regions and also to share regional resources. To capture their solution to extremism Group 2 provided a model (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Group 2 Model

One of the assumptions driving this model is that if the problem is prevented from developing, there will be few or no consequences. This model applies a nonlinear approach where multiple processes are executed in parallel. Much of the work depends on *soft* power centered on local levels closest to specific problems. However, further discussions are necessary to identify under what conditions and in what ways *hard* power should be employed. Also essential is the development of intelligence and information-sharing protocols to animate the model.

This model, welcomed by the attendees, has the potential to provide a path for future discussions and programming for the Sovereign Challenge community. More precisely, the circles represent an abstraction of an ongoing process of confronting extremism as it is defined by respective sovereign nations. The issues "floating" within the respective circles are concrete and relevant, not abstract and transient. Thus they can form the foundation on which future Sovereign Challenge work is based.

Groups 3 & 4, Sovereign Solutions to *Transnational Crime*

Group 3 examined the threats to sovereignty and quality of life posed by transnational criminal organizations. Sovereignty assumes a sense of "place," defined by borders and supported by good governance. Transnational criminal organizations transcend those borders and international structures; weaken state institutions and alienate people from society through the introduction of drugs, weapons smuggling, human trafficking, money laundering, extortion, and other activities; and undermine the security, good order and governance by sovereign authorities.

Recognizing the complexity of the threats, Group 3 concluded that the military has a role to play, but not likely the lead role. In fact, it concluded that police and paramilitary police are almost always the best solution. The consensus was that the military, "except in very, very extraordinary circumstances, should not be the lead agency…and will be more or less important in each case, but always in a supporting role."

Because of globalization, physical borders are increasingly open for unhindered travel and exploitation while virtual borders, enabled by new technology, create an environment in which financial and other systems essentially operate outside traditional limits. These conditions enable transnational criminals to complement the activities of extremists. Though transnational criminals and extremists may have different motivations—financial and ideological, respectively—they tend to rely and leverage similar funding, logistics, transportation, and security support.

Crime corrupts civil society, causing the people to lose confidence in institutions in which they believe. The undermining of the rule of law increases lawlessness both internally and across borders, encourages the spread of violence, and weakens state and international institutions.

Group 3 sought solutions to eliminate the physical and virtual weaknesses and seams that can be exploited by both transnational criminals and extremists. These solutions include rule-of-law initiatives, information sharing, complementary strategy development, and procedural cooperation through bilateral, regional, and international protocols.

Group 4 framed their group discussions of extremism as *ideological* vs. *theological*. It was noted that the vast majority of Muslims are "normal" as indicated by a common greeting: "Assalaam-Alaikum," which means "peace on you." It was also noted that few Muslims are linked with Islamists.

Additionally the "state" and "legislation" are both not mentioned in the Koran. This awareness points to a need for theological education and a more informed understanding of the nature of the debate that challenges the ideology and rhetoric that feeds extremism. There was consensus that there is a link between transnational crime and the jihadists—because the jihadists need money and transportation networks for operations (e.g., to make and transport bombs); however, it was also noted that it is not expensive to spread ideas.

In addressing various solutions to transnational crime, Group 4 began by defining it as follows: crimes that are not only international but also involve border crossings where the crime originates in one country and the consequences are felt in other countries. Examples given included drug trafficking, human trade, weapons and arms smuggling, and terrorism. The group drew a strong link between transnational crime and terrorism recognizing that terrorists exploit criminal communications, logistics, transportation, and finance networks. A key differentiation is that terrorism is a high profile political crime, and transnational crime is a lower profile socioeconomic crime.

They proposed a three-tier solution at the international, regional, and national levels. At the international level they recommend a strong rule of law and justice program coupled with increased cooperation and coordination (e.g., intelligence sharing). Regionally they recommend an emphasis on border security, extradition and cooperation, and coordination. At the national level the root causes must be identified to reduce the demand for transnational criminal services. Facilitating factors at the national level include information sharing, interagency coordination, and capacity building for law and police forces. Military support for transnational crime missions was downplayed and only deemed necessary to address temporary challenges beyond law enforcement capabilities.

Groups 5 & 6, Sovereign Solutions to *Migration and Border Security*

Group 5 broadened its definition of *migration* to include the movement of people both internally within a country and internationally across borders. In their view, internal migration in many states creates the same social and structural issues of international migration and the same kinds

of problems for the stability of the international system. They expressed the very clear understanding that within these movements of people are embedded the ideological, political, cultural, social, economic, security (including criminals and terrorists), and legal challenges to the current status quo. These issues move with people and are created or aggravated by the movement itself and by the activities of those who seek criminal or political advantage.

The group concluded that migration must be more effectively *managed* through international cooperation because it probably can't be fully *controlled*. People will move toward physical security and economic opportunity; globalization both magnifies issues of security and opportunity and facilitates movement. Failure to manage borders and migrations invites other challenges to sovereignty such as crime, extremism, political opportunism, and failed governance. Any failure will be exploited by a variety of nonstate actors, and sometimes state actors, for a range of purposes.

People move for security—physical and economic. Movement can serve the interests of the states and be encouraged in good times; migration creates more issues in economic downturns. Border issues and migration in many parts of the world are exacerbated by the arbitrary nature of the borders themselves, often reflecting a lingering legacy from colonialism or past wars. However, this is not to say that these arbitrary borders are not important. All borders are important and an integral part of a state's identity—changes could create the next problem set for regional stability. Geography still matters. States with large coasts or inaccessible terrain face different security problems than mutually accessible states, but globalization has also affected the latter by enabling increasing numbers of people to travel and to present themselves at international borders. *Open* border solutions, such as Europe, do not solve all movement-related issues.

Efficient assimilation of migrating populations is necessary to address concerns over changes to national identity, perceived erosion of language and culture, shifts in political balance through the introduction of new ideologies, opportunities for radicalization, and the reordering of internal and external national priorities. The nations that best manage assimilation also best shape sovereignty.

Migrations also impose serious humanitarian and resource requirements that place stress on the abilities of individual countries to respond and often require transnational cooperation to address. Transnational cooperation

is also essential for eliminating the weaknesses and seams discussed by all the groups and to address the regional instability that provides havens for criminal and extremist threats. One of the lingering concerns for Group 5 is the need to define the roles of military and police forces in managing borders and to develop an *interagency* capacity to address that complex challenge.

Proposed solutions included bilateral, multilateral, collective and cooperative approaches to border management programs; harmonized border surveillance procedures; the use and exchange of common information formats and supporting technology internally within states and externally among states; better training; competitive pay for border security personnel; a study of best practices from those countries successfully managing their borders; building political will to secure borders; and the development of international *norms* to assist in defining citizenship and facilitating assimilation.

Group 6 felt that before any value could be derived from a discussion of peripheral issues (i.e., migration and border security), a clear strategy was needed. Because no clear strategy was apparent, further discussions would be seen as hiding under a "tactical band-aid," a practice that will not lead to a strategy. In breakout group sessions, they identified nine key discussion points:

a. Israel-Palestine Issue. There appears to be no immediate solution to this situation. Countries that have invested resources into either side have lost more (people, money, culture) than they have gained. The concern is not that there is conflict because territorial conflicts exist all over the world. Rather the issue is how other countries respond to the conflict.

b. Globalization challenges sovereignty by leading to a loss of both individual and state identity. Boundaries (some historically arbitrary) are disrupted, economic conditions force people to pay more for basic needs, and the normal progression of life is broken (e.g., culture and family ties), thereby disrupting and disorienting the population.

c. Reliance on religion is frequently a problem as it provides hope and fuels expectations without concrete solutions or the practical paths to reach them.

d. Education is critical. However, a belief in a plausible future is essential to the development of a forward-looking perspective and the desire to acquire the skills necessary to build that future.

e. Cost-Benefit Analysis. Terrorism will always exist, so the complete elimination of terrorism is an impractical goal. Sovereign states must decide if and where exists a trigger point at which it is no longer possible to tolerate the disruptions caused by terrorism and it becomes necessary to take actions against that terrorist threat.

f. There is a need for strategic communication campaigns to counter the Al Qaeda "brand." Though Al Qaeda has been successful in marketing its "business model" internationally, it represents a flawed product and must be challenged. Strategic communication campaigns should target both the ideology and practices of Al Qaeda and related organizations. Political, religious, business, and other cultural opinion leaders have critical roles to play in this process. Successful campaigns will defeat the message and discredit the "brand," thus rendering the terrorist irrelevant.

g. *Democracy* is not well defined or understood. In Iraq, members of the international community instituted democracy before educating the people about its complexities. Therefore, many interpreted democracy as allowing for unbridled behavior in the practice of individual freedom, frequently expressed through anarchy. The role of personal responsibility was not always emphasized. Care must be taken when introducing unfamiliar social and political norms into countries with thousands of years of social history that is often inconsistent with the assumptions, structures, and processes of democracy.

h. Collaboration and cooperation are essential. If sovereign states can arrive at collective agreement on the nature of security threats, common interests, and shared practices and procedures, collaboration and cooperation will be more effective.

i. Efficiency of effort. Too many resources and too much rhetoric are being expended to try to capture or kill Osama bin Laden. Such efforts only serve to strengthen his image and empower his followers to pursue his vision. A more efficient path to success is to seek ways to marginalize him and other Al Qaeda leaders who are often perceived to be failing anyway.

In addressing their assigned topic of Sovereign Solutions to Migration and Border Security, Group 6 believes there will always be migration for economic, political, social, and humanitarian reasons. Immigration is a human condition that each country deals with differently based upon their situation, geography, and threats. They also noted that migration challenges small countries by overburdening social services and, more ominously, by posing demographic and political threats to national stability. The U.S. was cited as an example of a country with a high level of immigrant integration into society and politics, even as migration remains a compelling and controversial issue there.

The theme of regional cooperation to solve migration issues was emphasized with the European Union as an example of a regional agreement among member nations with common policy. Solutions included preventing or controlling migration through investment in borders and the use of technology and regional and national cooperation to provide responsible measures to control threats posed by migration to neighboring countries.

Conclusion

As documented within this report, the 4th Annual Sovereign Challenge Conference offered a dynamic environment for the presentation of ideas, the exchange of viewpoints, and the crafting of a viable way ahead for future Sovereign Challenge activities.

A collection of prominent speakers sparked discussion among six groups considering the issues of Migration and Border Security, Transnational Crime, and Extremism under the umbrella theme of *Global Threats—Sovereign Solutions*. The direct participation of the speakers in the breakout groups allowed attendees to participate in greater depth in the discussion.

Group presentations during the final session brought forth a variety of common themes and observations. These reflected the successful efforts expended by participants working collectively on addressing terrorist threats to national sovereignty.

Equally important is the fact that the conference produced a chart that addresses the threats posed by extremism and provides a pathway for further Sovereign Challenge discussions and activities. Developed by Discussion Group 2, the chart attracted such interest that it was posted on the Sovereign Challenge Web site to solicit wider comments and suggestions to build upon the various initiatives portrayed.

Consequently, this Report of Proceedings contains not only a record of the conference agenda but also suggests a practical path into the future to explore initiatives to ensure national sovereignty in the face of terrorist threats. ⬆